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application for suspension be made in good faith.33 Suspension should not
be denied on the basis of political beliefs that do not in themselves justify
deportation. To assure that these standards are followed, the Immigration
Service should be required to hold a full hearing, not only on the question of
whether the alien technically qualifies for suspension,14 but also on the
question of whether suspension should be granted. At that hearing, the
alien should be given opportunity to rebut all evidence and charges intro-
duced against him on both points.35 The Attorney-General's decision should
then be based solely on the record made at the hearing.35 These steps would
enable a reviewing court to examine the record for evidence to support the
decision and to determine whether the decision conforms to the prescribed
standards of guidance. In this way, the harshness springing from the At-
torney-General's broad discretion can be eliminated.
STATE SUPERVISION OVER INSURANCE RATE-MAKING
COMBINATIONS UNDER THE McCARRAN ACT*
INSURANcE rates are calculated on the assumption that future losses
will reflect past experience. Promulgation of accurate rates depends there-
33. Conceivably, an alien, knowing of the provisions of the law, might illegally enter
the country and deliberately establish his eligibility for suspension as part of a preconceived
plan to gain permanent residence in the United States by means of this procedure. Since
the law provides that all suspended deportation orders be counted against the immigration
quota of the alien's country of nationality, 54 STAT. 671 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 155c (1946), the
interest of fairness to other prospective immigrants from that country demands that only
bona fide claimants to suspension of deportation be given favorable consideration.
34. Of course, the regulations of the Immigration Service already assure the alien a full
hearing on all issues relating to his eligibility for suspension. See note 18 supra.
35. Although there was no opportunity to rebut the basis of the Attorney-General's
decision in the Kaloudis case, this has always been regarded as basic to due process of law.
See, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 227 U.S. 88, 93 (1913).
For an application of this principle to discretionary relief proceedings, see U.S. ex rel. Sal-
vetti v. Reimer, 103 F.2d 777, 779 (2d Cir. 1939).
36. This has always been regarded as a fundamental attribute of a fair hearing. See,
Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745, 749 (8th Cir. 1915); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S.
454 (1920). This requirement was adopted by the Immigration Service in suspension pro-
ceedings as a result of the case of Matter of Alexiou, A-6178382, Bd. of Imm. App. Nov. 8,
1949, cited in Brief for Relator, p. 33. The Board held that "while the grant or denial of
suspension of deportation is discretionary, the exercise of this discretion must be based upon
the evidence of record." This position was approved by the Attorney-General, although he
later reversed himself without explanation. Brief for Respondent, p. 11. For a further
illustration of the principle that the decision must be based on evidence in record see U.S.
cx rel. Bauer v. Shaughnessy, Civ. 50-217 (S.D. N.Y. 1949). Contra, U.S. ex rel. Von Klec-
zkowski v. Watkins, 71 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. N.Y. 1947) (Attorney-General permitted to rely
on "top secret" military report in denying discretionary relief).
* North Little Rock Transportation Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 181 F.2d
174 (8th Cir 1950), cert. denied, 19 U.S.L. WFna 3087 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1950).
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fore on the use of comprehensive loss data. But few companies do enough
business in all lines of insurance to amass a statistical base broad enough for
reliable prediction of all types of losses. As a result, individual companies
have found it necessary to pool their loss experience.' And since the cost of
maintaining separate rating systems is prohibitive, 2 insurers have gone
beyond the joint compiling of statistics to engage in joint rate making. 3
However compelling the business reasons for permitting collaboration in the
setting of insurance rates,4 that prattice fell directly under the price-fixing
interdiction of the Sherman Act' when in 1944 insurance was judicially
1. See KNIGHT, RIsK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 245-52 (1921); Gorman, State Reg-
ulation and Public Law 15, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION 301, 303 (1946); Gardner, Insurance and the Anti-Trust Laws, 61 HARV.
L. REV. 246, 258 (1948); Note, The Regulation of Insurance Rates, 47 COl.. L. REv. 1314,
1317-18 (1947).
2. In some insurance fields, forexample, in workmen's compensation, the rate structure
is so complicated that it is impractical, if not impossible, for a company to make its own
rates. In such fields, if a company is to survive, it must belong to a rating bureau. The
operation of the bureau is so expensive that there is little likelihood of competing bureaus
performing the same function. For an example, see State v. American Insurance Co., 355
Mo. 1053, 200 S.W.2d 1, 9 (1947). On the other extreme lie some rating fields in which
companies can readily make their own rates. But even here, companies find it expendient
to combine their rate making functions in order to simplify one phase of their operations
and reduce one large item of overhead expense. See N. Y. Insurance Superintendent Dineen,
The Rating Problem, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW, AMiERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 104, 113 (1945).
3. An additional reason for permitting collaboration is that free and unregulated com-
petition in insurance, which has had a fair trial in this country under many old state anti-
combination statutes, has proved spectacularly unsuccessful. Rate wars resulted in the
destruction of small companies and the demoralization of the industry. See Maryott, Why
Regulate Insurance Rates, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW, .AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION 305, 310-11 (1946). And cf. Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 65 (1940):
"Government has always had a special relation to insurance. The ways of safeguarding
against the untoward manifestations of nature and other vicissitudes of life have long been
withdrawn from the benefits and caprices of free competition."
People unpersuaded of the tremendous cost of rating might suggest that the advantages
flowing from the free interchange of loss data may be achieved without sanctioning the
further step of joint rate making. But at least one eminent authority feels that no practical
line can be drawn between joint compilation and joint rate setting, and that a state must
choose squarely between prohibiting or permitting (and regulating) collaboration. PATTER-
SON, THE INSURANCE COMmISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 273 (1927).
4. The additional reason has been advanced that the assurance of solvency-a prim-
ary purpose of regulation-can best be achieved by eliminating competition and permitting
insurers to cushion rates by joint action. This view is indicated, though not necessarily
espoused, by Gardner, Insurance and the Anti-Trust Laws, 61 HARv. L. REV. 246, 272 (1948).
Former Assistant Attorney General Berge insists, on the other hand, that state regulation
guards against insolvency by compelling insurers to maintain reserves and restricting the
range of their investments. He also asserts that underwriting judgment and executive man-
agement are more important to the preservation of financial stability than agreement on
rates. Berge, Insurance and the Anti-trust Laws, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF INSUR-
ANCE LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 29, 33 (1946).
5. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1946). The principle is now firmly estab-
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declared interstate commerce.6 As the peculiarities of the insurance business
render insistence on separate action by each insurer neither feasible nor
desirable, Congress was urgently solicited to exempt joint rate making in
this field from the applicability of the antitrust laws.
But Congress was not prepared to acquiesce in completely uncontrolled
private rate-making. Anxiety was expressed that a non-competitive in-
dustry, if unregulated, might ensconce incompetent management and under-
writing by maintaining an artificially hiih rate structure.
7
Some governmental surveillance being clearly indicated, Congress was
faced with the alternative of devising a federal supervisory scheme or
authorizing control by the states. The decision in favor of the latter re-
flected the fear that chaos would accompany the disruption of well-rooted
state regulation and taxation of insurance companies.8 Thus, the McCarran
lished that price fixing combinations in interstate commerce are illegal per se under the
Sherman Act regardless of the reasonableness of the restraint. United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940).
6. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944),
the Supreme Court upheld an indictment charging the member companies of the South-
Eastern Underwriters Association with conspiring to restrain trade in interstate commerce
by combining to set insurance rates. The effect of the decision was to reverse the seventy-
five year old rule of Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868), that the writing of a policy of in-
surance was not a transaction in commerce.
The South-Eastern Underwriters case has been extensively commented on. See, e.g.,
Berke, Is the Business of Insurance Commerce? 42 MicE. L. REv. 409 (1943); Powell, Insur-
ance as Commerce, 57 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1944); Notes, 32 GEo. L. REv. 66 (1943); 29
MARQ. L. REV. 55 (1944); 45 COL. L. REV. 927 (1945); 20 IND. L. REV. 184 (1947). See also,
Timberg, Insurance and Interstate Commerce, 50 YALE L.J. 959 (1941) which preceded and
predicted the decision.
7. Joint Hearings, Subcommittee of Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1362, H.R. 3269,
and H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., Parts 1-4, 55-57, 142 (1943). This fear was well
substantiated by the conditions prevailing prior to the South-Eastern Underwriters decision.
Thus a Department of Justice survey concluded that about one half of the states in which
rating bureaus operated made inadequate provision for regulation and left the public vir-
tually at the mercy of insurance companies. See Orfield, Improving State Regulation of Insur-
ance, 32 MINN. L. REV. 219, 233 (1948). A survey undertaken by a legal commentator
arrived at the same conclusion. See Note, Insurance, A Survey of State Rate Regulation, 33
GEO. L.J. 70. 90-1 (1944). Such information prompted Congress to reject the Walter-Bailey-
Van Nuys Bill, S. 1362, H.R. 3269, H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), introduced be-
fore the Supreme Court handed down the South-Eastern Underwriters case, which purported
to exempt the insurance business entirely from the federal antitrust laws.
8. See SEN. REP. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
For an additional reason underlying the congressional preference for state control, see
Professor Patterson: "An insurance company which [under the present system of state con-
trol wants] to do a countrywide business [is] compelled, in order to obtain a license to do
business in the more populous states, to conform its investments and many other practices
to the highest standard set by any of these states. I doubt if Congressional legislation,
emerging from the mill of countless local pressure groups, would set as high standards for
countrywide operation." Patterson, The Future of State Supervision of Insurance, 23 TEx. L.
REV. 18, 31 (1944).
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Act of 1945 1 provided that "the Sherman Act . . . shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by
State law." 10
In passing the McCarran Act, Congress contemplated not only that state
legislation must be adequate in scope but also that insurance commissioners
must exert effective supervision. This construction of the statute can be
gleaned from the language of the statute itself, from its somevhat incon-
clusive history," and from congressional awareness of the ineffectiveness and
9. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (Supp. 1946).
10. 59 STAT. 33,34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (Supp. 1946).
11. In support of this construction, see, e.g., Senator Barkley: "If anystate, through its
legislature, undertakes to go through the form of regulation merely to put insurance com-
panies within that state on an island of safety from Congressional legislation, that effort
will be futile." 91 CONG. REc. 1488 (1945). Attorney General Biddle: "The view we hold
toward insurance is not unlike our policy toward railroad rates, that the fixing of rates by
private groups without active and definite state approval is a clear contravention not only
of the [Sherman] Act but also of the whole theory which underlies the Act, the theory that
competition should be free unless it is specifically regulated by the appropriate body ...
I think there is no doubt at all that insurance rates which are approved by a state are not
subject to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. By that I mean that if a group of insurance com-
panies agreed on rates and filed them with a state commission, and that body took active and
definite action, made active and definite approval of those rates, [italics supplied] in that case I
think the matter would not be involved at all in the Sherman Act." Quoted by Orfield,
Improving State Regulation of Insurance, 32 MINN. L. REV. 219, 225-6 (1948). President
Roosevelt, upon signing Public Law 15: ". . . the anti-trust laws . . . will be applicable in
full force and effect to the business of insurance except to the extent that the states have
assumed the responsibility, and are effectively performing that responsibility, [italics supplied]
for the regulation of whatever aspect of the insurance business may be involved. . . . Con-
gress did not intend to permit private rate fixing, which the anti-trust acts forbid, but was
willing to permit actual regulation of rates by affirmative action of the states." White House
Release, March 10, 1945, quoted in Donovan, Regulation of Insurance Under the McCarran
Act, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 473,478 (1950).
After the Act's passage, Senator O'Mahoney said: "It will not be sufficient merely to
announce the principle or to pass laws in the several states which formally assert state
authority. If there is to be state regulation, the states must have insurance departments
which are competent to regulate, that is to say, which are competent to examine, audit, and
understand the complexities of the insurance business." Address before the Insurance
Federation of New York, December 5, 1945, quoted in Orfield, Improving State Regulation of
Insurance, 32 MINN. L. REV. 219, 227 (1948). That construction of the Act is now unequiv-
ocally rejected by Senator McCarran, one of the sponsors of the legislation, who asserts that
". .. the intent of the Act was not to accomplish any particular degree of stringency of
regulation, but to keep regulation at the State level, and forestall Federal regulation. .... o
Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Senator McCarran, dated April 21, 1950,
in Yale Law Library.
Some light as to the required degree of state supervision can be drawn from the anal-
ogous situation presented in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). There, a California
statute authorized the establishment of agricultural marketing programs through action
of state officials in order to restrict competition for price maintenance purposes. The action
by state officials consisted of 1) granting of premiums to institute a program, 2) approval
and/or modification of the program, and 3) enforcement of the program by statutory sanc-
tion. In an action by a producer to enjoin the enforcement of a program, the Supreme
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abuse of state supervision of rate-making prior to the Act.12 These deficien-
cies could be remedied only by federal intervention or by ably enforced state
regulation.
The states quickly undertook to follow the congressional invitation and
warning. Uniform bills, authorizing rate-making by combinations of in-
surers and purporting to regulate it, were drafted by the Conference of
Insurance Commissioners and representatives of the industry.13 The bills
Court upheld its validity despite the price-fixing provision of the Sherman Act on the ground
that ". . the prorate program derives its authority and its efficacy from the legislative
command of the state and was not intended to become effective without that command....
The Sherman Act gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action
directed by the state." Id. at 350-1. It would appear likely that by analogy to Parker v.
Brown, the test of validity of rate-fixing legislation should be the degree of actual participa-
tion by the state. See Note, State Regulation of the Insurance Business and the Sherman Act,
96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 222, 228-9 (1947).
12. The crassest example is that of the state of Missouri. There, in 1922, the Superin-
tendent of Insurance ordered a reduction of 10% of fire insurance rates. The companies,
acting jointly through a rating bureau, promptly raised the rates 16V3%. It took 25 years
of litigation, hampered by ineffectual state statutes and the bribery of two Insurance Com-
missioners, to resolve the dispute in the State's favor. See State v. American Insurance Co.,
355 Mo. 1053, 200 S.W.2d 1 (1947). In 1943, Attorney-General McKittrick of Missouri,
despairing of ever settling the matter, sought the aid of the Justice Department, whose re-
sulting investigation culminated in the South-Eastern indictment, see note 6 supra, which
charged 200 companies with combining to maintain arbitrary and non-competitive premium
rates. The Congressional hearings, held continuously since October 1943 till the passage of
the McCarran Act, were motivated largely by the South-Eastern indictment. Note, State
Regulation of Insurance Rating, 41 ILL. L. REv. 647, 648, 654 (1947).
That Congress regarded effective enforcement of a state statute as a prerequisite of
antitrust immunity is also inferable from its rejection of the Walter-Bailey-Van Nuys
Bill, supra note 7. If Congress was unwilling to place insurance rate making combinations
entirely beyond the reach of the antitrust laws, then it is unlikely that Congress intended
to acquiesce in the states' circumventing the anti-trust laws by passing deficient statutes
or by failing to enforce adequate ones. For legal commentaries supporting this position,
:ee Orfield, Improvement of Insurance Laws, 32 MINN. L. REv. 219, 224 (1948); Berge,
Insurance and the Anti-trust Laws, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 29, 34 (1946); SAWYER, INSURANCE AS INTERSTATE COM-
IMERCE, 78-81 (1945); Dineen, The Rating Problem, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF INSUR-
ANCE LAW, AmERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 104, 109-10 (1945). But see Naujoks, Regulation
of the Insurance Business and Public Law 15, 30 MARQ. L. REV. 77, 91 (1946), who believes
that the McCarran Act is complied with if the state merely sets up a statutory stand-
ard for insurance rates.
13. Two model bills were drafted, one to regulate casualty and surety rate-making;
the other to apply to the fire, marine, and inland marine fields.
The provisions of the two bills are not materially different. Each attempts to give
effect to five main principles: 1) All premiums shall be determined in accordance with written
schedules, based on the analysis of past experience, and open to public inspection. 2) The
services of every rating bureau shall be available to every underwriting organization which
desires to utilize its services. 3) Every insurer may either file its own rates independently,
or adopt those of a licensed rating bureau. 4) The insured shall have access to the schedule
by which the premium is determined and the statistics on which the schedule is based.
5) The state insurance commissioner may disapprove any premium schedule filed by any
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were adopted by substantially all the states.1 4 In North Little Rock Trans-
portation Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange,15 they met their first judicial
test.
Plaintiff, a taxicab company in Little Rock, Arkansas, incurred excessive
liability in the course of his operations. After his automobile liability policy
was cancelled on that ground, plaintiff applied for insurance to defendant
Aetna Surety Co., a member of defendant National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters. The Bureau did all the rating for Aetna and for more than
fifty other insurance companies which subscribed to its services.16 A pre-
mium rate, substantially higher than any plaintiff had previously paid, was
established on the basis of the combined experience of the Bureau's sub-
scribers and of data furnished by plaintiff's prior insurer. Any other member
of the Bureau would have exacted an identical rate from plaintiff. After
paying the first premium, plaintiff brought a treble damages action under
the Sherman Act, alleging that defendants' joint rate-making constituted
a price-fixing combination which was unlawful despite the McCarran Act
and the Arkansas regulatory statute. 1
7
The District Court, finding no dispute as to any material facts,'" granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 9 In a unanimous decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the lower court, affirming that
the bare existence of state regulatory legislation immunized all rate-making
activities from the application of the federal antitrust acts. 20
one if, and only if, he finds that the rates are "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discrimina-
tory." See Gardner, Insurance and the Anti-trust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REv. 246, 247-9, 260-65
(1948), for a detailed analysis of the provisions of the bills.
The statutes, as adopted by the States, are generally uniform with one exception: some
states require affirmative approval of rates by the proper state official within a definite
period of time, others provide that if the rates are not disapproved within the waiting period
they become effective automatically thereafter. See Note, State Regulation of the Insurance
Business, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 223, 226-7 (1947). See also page 166 infra.
14. The fire and marine bill is now in effect in all 48 states, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico
and the District of Columbia and the casualty bill in all except Idaho. For a complete
listing of state statutes, see Donovan, Regulation of Insurance Under the McCarran Act, 15
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 471,485-6 (1950).
15. 181 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 3087 (U. S. Oct. 10, 1950).
16. The member companies of the Bureau write approximately 56% of all automobile
liability insurance written in Arkansas. Transcript of Record, pp. 19, 155-7, 224, North
Little Rock Transportation Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 181 F.2d 174 (8th Cir.
1950).
17. ARK. AcTs 1947, No. 116, ARK. STATS. ANN. §§ 66-417-66-431 (1947). The In-
surance Commissioner of Arkansas filed a one-page Intervenor's Brief asserting the validity
of the Arkansas statute.
18. Transcript of Record, supra note 16, at 225.
19. North Little Rock Transportation Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 85 F.
Supp. 961 (E.D. Ark. 1949).
20. 181 F.2d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1950).
Plaintiff also contended that the McCarran Act effected an invalid delegation of federal
power to the states, and that the Arkansas regulatory act must fall if the federal statute from
which the state act derived its force was unconstitutional. But as the Supreme Court had
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Since one of the major objectives of the McCarran Act is to assure that
private rate-making will not go unregulated, 2 the court's decision does not
seem justified. Plaintiff should at least have been given the opportunity to
demonstrate that Arkansas does not accomplish that purpose.
The Arkansas statute 22 does not on its face assure effective regulation or
show an appreciation of the rationale underlying congressional toleration
of combined action in the rate-making field. The statute provides for the
filing of all rates, and gives the Insurance Commissioner the power to dis-
approve those that are "unreasonable, inadequate or discriminatory."
But the efficacy of that provision is diminished by the addition of a "deemer
clause" which stipulates that rates filed shall be deemed approved unless
affirmatively disapproved by the Insurance Department. 3 While provisions
for advance approval of rates would compel the Commissioner to act
promptly, deemer clauses relieve him of industry pressure for rate approval
and thus encourage administrative lethargy.
24
previously affirmed the constitutionality of the McCarran Act, Prudential Insurance Co.
v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), the court readily disposed of plaintiff's constitutional
arguments.
21. See notes 11, 12 supra.
22. ARK. AcTs 1947, No. 116 (1947). In substance, the statute contains the following
provisions: § 3: a) Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or discriminatory. b) In compil-
ing the rates, consideration shall be given to loss experience, a reasonable margin for profit,
expenses and all over relevant factors. § 4: a) All rates must be filed with the Insurance
Commissioner. The Commissioner may require the insurer to furnish information in support
of the filing. b) A filing shall be deemed to meet the requirements of this act unless disap-
proved by the Commissioner. § 5: If the Commissioner finds any filings not to conform to the
requirements of the Act, he may suspend them, and, after notice and hearing, disapprove
them. § 6: Rating organizations must be licensed by the Commissioner. As one condition
of securing a license, each rating organization must agree to permit non-members to sub-
scribe to its services and to furnish information to members and subscribers without dis-
crimination. This provision was intended to end discrimination against mutual companies.
§ 7: If a member or subscriber of a bureau wishes to deviate from an established rate he may
apply to the Commissioner, and permission to deviate shall be granted if the Commissioner
after a hearing finds the departure justified. § 9: Each rating bureau or individual insurer
must upon written request make available to an insured all information pertinent to the
promulgation of a rate. A person who feels aggrieved by a particular rate may apply to the
Commissioner for a hearing. § 16: Violation of the act is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
of between $50 and $500. The Commissioner may also suspend or revoke the violator's
license.
23. ARK. AcTs 1947, No. 166, § 4(d): "... A filing shall be deemed to meet the re-
quirements of this act unless disapproved by the Commissioner within the waiting period
or any extension thereof."
24. When the uniform bills were enacted, many states felt that they lacked the facil-
ities and experience to act on rates promptly. Where that condition prevailed, recourse was
taken to deemer clauses to prevent disruption of the smooth functioning of the insurance
industry.
The main objection to deemer clauses is, of course, that they place a premium on inac-
tion and thus detract from the ideal of expeditious, affirmative and effective action on rate
filings. Moreover, the feasibility of advance approval of rates has been recognized by many
states which incorporated that provision in their model bills, see note 13 supra, and by the
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The statute contains the additional imperfection of permitting groups of
insurers to include in the rates filed not only the pooled loss experience of the
various companies but also such non-risk elements as administrative ex-
pense, acquisition cost, and profit. 25 As such items are not uniform for all
companies, any rate agreed upon by competitors must be so weighted as to
protect the least efficient operator. Cost factors such as these, which do not
contribute to the goal of actuarial creditability, should not enjoy exemption
from the antitrust laws."
Nor are defects in state control statutes the only obstacles to the full
regulation envisioned by the McCarran Act. The congressional purpose
may also be frustrated by lax enforcement. Thus, while the complexity of
rate regulation demands the services of skilled and experienced men aided
by adequate appropriations, state insurance departments suffer from a
chronic insufficiency of staff and budget. 7 The Arkansas Department,
fact that advance approval or disapproval has been the practice for years in many states in
the field of workmen's compensation insurance. See Dineen, The Rating Problem, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW, AIERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 105, 107, 110-11
(1945).
Deemer clauses are objectionable on the further ground that they induce reliance on the
part of the insurer. Disapproval of a rate subsequent to its effective date and after the agents
have been supplied by the companies with manuals works a hardship on the agents. Equal
hardship is worked on the companies. Thus, when the State of Virginia ruled that rates filed
by certain companies were excessive and ordered the surcharge returned on 4000 policies,
the cost of refunding exceeded the total surcharge. Corollarily, the tremendous incon-
venience and expense faced by the company in returning a surcharge may dissuade the
Commissioner from disapproving a rate even when he eventually finds it to be unreasonable.
See Dineen, supra; Note, State Regulation of Insurance Rating, 41 ILL. L. REv. 647, 658
(1947).
25. ARx. ACTS 1947, No. 116, § 3(a)(1).
26. This position is forcefully maintained by Berge, Insurance and the Anti-Trust Laws,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW, AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION 29, 33
(1946).
The opponents of the "pure-premium" theory however insist that that doctrine would
destroy whatever advantages are said to derive from the pooling of loss experience. As in-
surers would be permitted to load the "pure premium" by whatever amount they deemed
appropriate, they would be in a position to start the most vicious rate wars by simply mak-
ing cuts on the expense side rather than on the loss side of the final rate. The familiar pattern
of unbridled rate competition would recur. See note 3 supra; Maryott, Why Regulate In-
surance Rates? PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW, AMNIERICAN BAR Asso-
CIATION 305, 315-17 (1946).
To this alarmist view, the advocates of "pure-premium" might rejoin that solvency of
insurers can be assured by state supervision over capital and investments and that the
statutory interdiction of unreasonable, inadequate or discriminatory rates, if properly en-
forced and applied to "final premiums," would prevent rate wars while retaining sub-
stantial leeway for the play of competitive forces. See note 4 supra.
27. If a system of state regulation of rates is to work equitably for both the public and
the companies, the men on both sides must be of comparable competence and must have
comparable facilities at their disposal. Whether that situation prevails is questionable.
While private rating organizations are in general amply staffed with able, experienced and
well-compensated individuals, many of whom have devoted a lifetime to some particular
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for example, has at most one trained casualty rater in its employ.2
-
It is therefore open to doubt whether the degree of supervision provided
by Arkansas meets the congressional test, since either statutory flaws or
inadequate enforcement may negative effective regulation. If, on a trial
of the issues, the plaintiff could have shown that the congressional standard
was not met, the Sherman Act should have been held applicable. 9 But the
court, by granting defendants' motion for summary judgment upon mere
proof of the validity of the legislation, affirmed the irrelevancy of actual
phase of rating, state insurance departments, which until very recently have concerned them-
selves with rate regulation in comparatively few states, are frequently not adequately staffed
to pass on rates. Men who are quite equal to the task of dealing with other phases of in-
surance regulation may not be equipped to undertake rating. The acquisition of personnel
sufficient quantitatively and qualitatively to engage in rating adds such a burden to the
Insurance Department budget that in California, for instance, responsible elements opposed
the passage of the model bills on the ground that the appropriation wofild have to be mul-
tiplied if the state expected to do a thorough job. And see note 24 supra for the proposition
that the existence of a deemer clause in a state regulatory statute may be evidence, in itself,
of legislative mistrust in the adequacy of its insurance department.
Insurance Departments may also suffer from lack of integrity on the part of officials, see
State v. American Insurance Co., 355 Mo. 1053, 200 S.W.2d 1 (1947) and note 12 supra,
or, much more significantly, from high turnover on the part of insurance commissioners and
the consequent breaks in the continuity of departmental policies. See Dineen, The Rating
Problem, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF INSuRANcE LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
104, 105-6 (1945).
28. The Arkansas Insurance Department is headed by a Commissioner who receives a
yearly salary of $5,000. A staff of 12 full-time employees contains one trained fire rate
analyst, a casualty "supervisor" as well as some clerical help. The yearly budget of the
Department is $64,064. See ARK. ACTS 1937, No. 2, § 3. In the automobile liability field
alone, the yearly underwriting, supervised by the Department involves $4,332,690. Tran-
script of Record, p. 158, North Little Rock Transportation Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Ex-
change, 181 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1950). The Assistant Insurance Commissioner of Arkansas
has indicated that if the Department had a larger staff and/or budget, it could do a more
thorough job of inquiring into the fairness of rates filed. Communication to the YALE LAW
JOURNAL from Whit Morgan, Assistant Insurance Commissioner of Arkansas, dated April 12,
1950 in Yale Law Library.
29. Cf. the applicability of the antitrust laws to railroad rates. In Georgia v. Penn-
sylvania Railroad Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), the Supreme Court upheld a Sherman Act
complaint charging some 20 railroad companies with engaging in a rate-fixing conspiracy
against the railroads' contention that the Sherman Act was inapplicable because the railroad
rates were subject to ICC regulation. As the Commission's power to reject rates was limited
to those that are unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory, the Court felt that Sherman Act
protection should extend to rates fixed collusively though they are within the "zone of rea-
sonableness." Id. at 461. See Dumbauld, Rate-fixing Conspiracies in Regulated Industries,
95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 643 (1945) passim. If the anti-trust laws apply where administrative
supervision does not by law extend to every cranny of a regulated industry, they should
apply where that supervision is ineffectual. Moreover, there is greater assurance in the
railroad than in the insurance industry that rates as originally fixed will be fair because of
the existence in the railroad industry of well-established forums in which sellers and buyers
(carriers and shippers) get together to discuss proposed rate changes before they are filed
See Dineen, The Rating Problem, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW, AMER-
ICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 105, 108 (1945).
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